Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press 3 Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press contract can improve the welfare of both borrowers and lenders. 5 A contract clause which raises the cost of default is generally viewed as an effective commitment mechanism that expands the contract space and enriches both borrowers and lenders ex ante. Indeed, private borrowers with questionable credit are often able to borrow vast sums at reasonable rates by agreeing to contract clauses that raise the cost of default to a level sufficient to convince lenders that the borrowers will fulfill their obligations. 6 Economists often lament the fact that while private borrowers can lower their costs of borrowing via contractual commitment mechanisms, sovereign immunity prevents sovereign borrowers from credibly submitting to third-party enforcement. In fact, one of the main puzzles of international economics is how sovereigns can issue debt at all given the absence of legal enforcement. 7 Compared to a world in which a sovereign could not be sued, the Argentina decision may actually improve credit access to sovereign borrowers by providing sovereigns with a long sought after mechanism to credibly commit to re-paying their debts.
To the historian, the consternation among some in the economic and legal community seems bizarre. In essence, the Argentina decision makes it difficult or impossible for sovereigns Econ. Rev. 519 (concluding, among other things, that "the use of hostages to support exchange is widespread and economically important," giving specific examples including, franchising relationships, whereby franchisers can better deter franchisee cheating by forcing franchisee investment that would result in greater loss upon termination than gain is available by cheating-thereby credibly committing to the franchiser-franchisee relationship). 6 Hypothecating collateral and personal recourse are two common examples. Literature 651 (" [T] here is still no fully satisfactory answer to how sovereign debt can exist in the first place."). Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press who include pari passu clauses in their debt contracts to issue new debt while in default on existing debt. But the practice of denying sovereign borrowers in default access to international capital markets was the common punishment between 1870 and 1914, 8 and that era is often cited as the golden age of international capital mobility.
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Sovereign borrowers enjoyed absolute immunity before 1914, 10 but informal institutions allowed sovereigns to use contract clauses to subject themselves to punishments remarkably similar to those imposed by the modern Argentine injunction. We argue that the rules of the London Stock Exchange allowed sovereigns to write bond contracts with clauses that raised the cost of default that were therefore viewed as a credible signal of intent to repay. As a result, sovereign borrowers of less than pristine reputation were able to enjoy the benefits of cheap access to world capital markets.
The pre-1914 era provides us with clues into how the sovereign debt market could evolve in the wake of the Argentina ruling. In contrast to the dire warnings of Professor Stiglitz, the historical market worked well. By pledging and undertaking actions that made default costly, historical sovereign borrowers used contract terms to signal their credibility and gain access to international markets at reasonable rates. The result was a more complete contract space that allowed sovereigns to partake in many of the benefits that collateral and court enforcement provide to private borrowers of less than sterling reputation. There is every reason to think that (mainly the rapidly-developing Americas and Australasia). At its peak, the outflow from Britain reached 9 percent of GNP and was almost as high in France, Germany, and the Netherlands."); see also id. ("In the years leading up to the Great War, it is said, international financial markets were even more integrated than today"). 10 See WMC Weidemaier, 'Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration' (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 335, Part II.A, 337-40 ("Accounts of sovereign lending emphasize that lenders had not effective legal recourse against defaulting sovereign borrowers before the latter half of the twentieth century"); Absolute sovereign immunity was largely in place in both England and the United States. See id. at 337 (noting that, in addition, "sovereign immunity doctrine in both countries permitted the state to withdraw its consent to be sued" even if the country purported to waive its sovereign immunity); FZ Ahmed et al., 'Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin America' (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 39, 42 (stating that the erosion of sovereign immunity in the United States did not start until 1976); but see Weidemaier, supra note 11, 337 ("In some jurisdictions, the principle of absolute immunity had begun to break down as early as the mid-nineteenth century"). Even if absolute sovereign immunity were avoided, foreign investors faced enforcement difficulties from inhospitable local courts, sovereign assets immune from execution and the unenforceability of arbitration clauses. Id. 337-338 ("For all these reasons, formal legal enforcement was virtually unavailable to sovereign lenders . . . ."). Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press by including pari passu clauses in their bond contracts modern sovereign borrowers can likewise raise the cost of default and thereby signal their commitment to re-pay and, as a result, borrow at lower rates.
Contractual Clauses as Commitment Mechanisms
Throughout history borrowers have attempted to lower their borrowing costs by taking actions that signal their intention to repay. Private borrowers have long benefited from the ability to commit to punishments via third-party enforcement. Typically, the private borrower writes a contract outlining sanctions should the loan not be repaid. If the sanctions are sufficiently onerous, lenders view the borrower's willingness to incur high costs in default as a credible signal that the loan will be repaid.
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Sovereign immunity precludes governments from submitting to traditional third-party of what is currently due to plaintiffs must also be paid." (Judge Griesa in NML v. Argentina).
24
20 Literally translating to "in equal step," and borrowed from bankruptcy, pari passu clauses purport to provide that debt associated with the contract will be, and will remain, of equal rank with the borrower's other debt in an attempt to prevent borrowers from later creating preferred debt. One basic example of the clause states that the debt being issued "ranks, and will rank pari passu with all other unsubordinated indebtedness of the borrower." Sometimes the phrase "and will be paid as such" is added, which purports to prevent discretionary payments among creditors. Alternatively, the clause may render the debt "pari passu in right of repayment and in all other respects," the significance of which is unknown and unclear. "disavow the ratable payment interpretation," "focus on the remedy," "limit pari passu to a representation" and "make it part of the bargain"-and predicting that sovereigns will eventually settle on option two); J Cotterill, 'Sovereign pari passu and the litigators of the lost cause' (2013) CMLJ (suggesting the clause should be redrafted to avoid the Second Circuit interpretation which resulted in inefficient litigation 
Why do sovereigns pay their debts? The repeated game
To understand how a legal change that makes borrowers worse off in default can actually make borrowers better off ex ante, we must understand how a sovereign who is immune to most legal consequences can convince lenders to voluntarily part with their money in the first place. A central puzzle in the international debt literature is why, if sovereign debt contracts cannot be enforced, sovereign borrowers ever choose to repay their debts, and thus why anyone would ever lend to a sovereign in the first place. Consider the loan-repayment decision tree below:
The potential lender will only extend a loan if the expected value of lending is sufficiently high to compensate for the risk of suffering a default. But the expected value of lending depends on the decisions of the borrower after the loan is made. The borrower will choose to default if the value of defaulting -V B (default) -is greater than the value of repaying -V B (repay). In a one-time game the benefits of repaying are small and the borrower will choose to default. The lender knows this, so no lending takes place.
In practice, sovereigns are able to borrow because sovereign borrowing is not a one-time event. Benevolent governments wish to finance government spending in the least economically costly manner. 28 In most instances, the least costly method of financing a given stream of government spending is a mix of taxes and borrowing that smoothes tax rates over time. But this "optimal tax" can only be achieved if the government has repeated access to credit markets.
Sovereigns wish to borrow in the future, and they know that how they treat current lenders will influence the lending decision of future lenders. Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press
In a repeated game, countries can access international markets by maintaining a good reputation for repayment. Repaying a loan today is valuable (i.e. V B (repay) is high) because it establishes a reputation for repayment which is rewarded with capital market access in the future.
The equilibrium with borrowing is characterized by lenders that lend cheaply to governments with good reputations for repayment and punish governments who default by refusing to lend to them in the future. Governments choose to repay because they value future market access more than any payments they could expropriate today with a default.
Defaults only occur in the repeated game when lenders underestimate the government's value of default or overestimate the value the government places on future market access. This often happens because the lenders decision to extend the loan and the government's decision to repay take place at different times, and the fiscal or political facts may change in unexpected ways between the decision to lend and the decision to repay. For this reason, countries with hardto-forecast fiscal balances or unpredictable political commitments will be charged a higher interest rate or perhaps excluded from the market altogether. The higher interest rate is necessary to increase the value of the loan to lenders (increase V L (repay)) to a sufficient level to compensate for the risk of default.
Unfortunately, there is a limit to how much interest rates can rise to compensate for default risk. Any increase in the interest rate produces two results: a pooling effect-whereby the only borrowers willing to pay the higher interest rate are those that are inherently riskier-and an incentive effect-whereby, because higher interest rates result in lower returns for the borrower, the borrower takes on riskier (and higher upside) projects. 29 As loan rates of interest increase, the borrower's value of future borrowing (V B (repay)) decreases and the value of default (V B (default)) increases until the borrower's best strategy is default. In this way, increasing interest rates can also increase the risks of the loans so that, beyond a certain threshold, increasing the interest rate actually decreases the expected value to the lender. 30 But lenders know this and therefore refuse to lend at usurious rates and countries with extremely volatile economies or unstable governments find themselves cut off from capital markets. Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press
Why do lenders trust they will be repaid? Control of future market access
Sovereign borrowers may also find themselves cut off from capital markets if today's lenders think future lenders will lend to governments regardless of their repayment histories. If a borrower can default but still access capital markets with little or no penalty, the future value of repaying (V B (repay)) will be low and default is likely. But current lenders know this and should therefore refuse to lend. The repeated game equilibrium relies on the future lenders collectively shunning a borrower who has a poor reputation for repayment. Therefore, the repeated game equilibrium requires a collective action mechanism to convince current lenders that future potential lenders will not lend to borrowers in default on their previous loans.
The model of international lending as a repeated game has empirical support from before World War I. As the theory goes, the threat of the loss of access to credit markets resulting from a default can, under certain conditions, sufficiently incentivize repayment. Before World War I, most sovereign borrowing took place on European exchanges with strong collective action mechanisms to punish defaulters, and repayment histories strongly influenced the terms of market access. Tomz (2007) showed that between 1820 and 1870, only 1 of 16 countries in default -Greece-was able to access the capital market, and was only able to do so after other non-defaulting countries gave loan guarantees. 31 Even when able to access capital markets, the [M]arkets did remember.") However, because over the medium term, the penalty for defaulting is more than offset by the savings associated with debt repudiation, the penalty from default was not a systematic deterrent. Id. Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press importance of the need to access international credit markets and, thus, the importance of maintaining one's reputation. In the post-World War II era, repayment history has only a small effect on the duration of capital market exclusion or the borrowing costs, and the main cost of a default episode is reflected in output loss and economic crises. 33 Thus, in modern times, "debts which are forgiven will be forgotten." 34 This is particularly true when the default is seen as excusable, in which case the defaulting sovereign is able to access the market even more quickly. Any increase in the cost of borrowing following a default similarly lasts only a short while, falling to negligible levels within a few years of default. 38 The amount of the increase in the cost of borrowing following modern defaults is between 3-4%. 39 However, evidence on punishment remains controversial. More recently and employing the most comprehensive dataset on sovereign defaults, Cruces and Trebesch find that default, and the resulting haircut upon restructuring, is correlated with an increase in spread and length of market exclusion felt by the defaulting sovereign. 
Why do lenders trust they will be repaid? Alternative punishments
The premise of enforcement by reputation has been challenged both on empirical and on theoretical grounds. Bulow and Rogoff, for instance, postulate that under certain conditions that 33 According to Panizza's comprehensive survey of the empirical literature, the finding that defaulters are not punished (enough) is based on studies using post-WWII data. Perhaps given the unsettled conclusion concerning the effectiveness of reputation as a commitment mechanism, the literature has broadened the concept of reputation and speculates on whether the impact on reputation may even spill over from the debt arena to other arenas where trust is important. For example, lenders may refuse to lend to a country with a reputation for economic instability-even if the issuing state has a good reputation for keeping its promises (i.e., the promise to not default)-because the country could simply devalue its currency. 43 However, the issuing state could circumvent its reputation for instability by issuing its debt in foreign currency. Thus, the state's separate reputation for promising keeping will allow access to capital markets even with a poor reputation for economic stability. As an alternative theory of multifold reputation, the reputational harm from defaulting can be felt by the exclusion, not just from credit markets, but from other future cooperative agreements. 44 Or, in a more abstract sense, by defaulting, a country has simply signaled to the world that it is in a general sense, not limited to the debt area, unreliable.
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Rather than expanding the concept of reputation as a commitment mechanism, another line of literature has expanded the range of retaliation to defaulting sovereigns. Creditors may punish bad debtors by threatening the debtor's interests outside its borrowing relationships through: 1) cutting or impeding trade with, or imposing a trade embargo upon, the debtor country 41 Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 8. 42 The literature on this is too vast to cite here; please see Cruces & Trebesh, supra note 42 for a list of the main references in the literature. 43 decline in bilateral trade per year subsequent to default) and duration (the reduction in trade was found to last 15 years) of the reduction in trade are significant -which could have a much larger impact on GDP than extra interest costs -, the mechanism by which trade is reduced is unclear.
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Such reductions in the borrowing sovereign's trade could be due to several channels or reasons hypothesized in the literature, with empirical evidence on each of these mechanisms ambiguous.
Other trade-restricting mechanisms to punish bad debtors include: (1) the imposition of direct trade barriers through the use of tariff and nontariff barriers against the defaulting country; (2) an increase in the cost of trading through the loss of trade credit resulting from default; and (3) the seizure of tradable foreign assets of the defaulting sovereign. True, nations that defaulted were better off conditional on default, but lenders knew this at the time of the loan and required compensation for default risk. A sovereign that could credibly convince lenders that they would be repaid would benefit from lower borrowing costs. 57 Borchard & Hotchkiss, supra note 18 ("In rare instances -as in the historic cases of Mexico (1861) and Venezuela (1902) -bondholders' governments have even resorted to armed force for the collection of debts; they based their action, however, not on the mere neglect of bondholders' claims but on the contention that the defaulting state had broken international agreements respecting payment which it had made with the intervening powers, or that the lives and property of their nationals were being menaced by disorder and revolution."). 58 
Generally, the hypothecation of some particular source of revenue to the purposes of a loan, has been looked upon as favourable. Where a specific branch of the revenue of a country is affected to the interest and to the redemption of a loan, at least some moral guarantee results for the security of the bondholders. A material difficulty is also raised to the misapplication of the funds required for the loan. In the case of the Government of Venezuela, the customs duties were specially assigned to be regularly paid over to the agents of the bondholders. But a public outrage was necessary to divert those funds from the purpose to which they had been consecrated. The world was thereby apprised of the violence and of the wrong committed, and a Government convicted of bad faith by such an instance stands at once discredited in every money market in the world. 69
Likewise, a prominent underwriter of sovereign debt writing in 1872 stated:
[T]he most essential element of a [sovereign] loan is the security hypothecated. A banker or broker will not lend money to an applicant on his promise of a liberal rate of interest or speedy repayment, without security; but on deposit ample and perfect security he will make advances allowing the rate of interest and mode of repayment to be settled hereafter. This proves, what is universally known, that the security for a loan is of more vital importance than the rate of interest and mode of repayment. In fact, the Turkish Government received full value in cash for the special securities of the Loans of 1858 and 1862, which becomes quite evident on comparing their prices of issue with the price of the 5 per cent Turkish Stock without special security, at those periods.
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The reader may wonder why investors valued contract terms that could not be enforced in any court. While it is tempting to think contract terms are only valuable if they can be enforced 67 The principle of absolute immunity comes from customary international law and was widely accepted through the nineteenth century. Importantly, the exchange did not require a missed payment to declare a nation in default.
Failure to adhere to the terms of various hypothecations was sufficient even when the bond itself was current on all payments. 78 Further, the question of what constituted a "satisfactory" settlement gave quasi-judicial powers to the LSE, making it a sort of International Court of Debt Arbitration. 79 In this way, the sovereignty of the LSE provided a mechanism by which bondholders could coordinate to protect themselves through extra-legal enforcement of sovereign debt clauses. The LSE generally looked to the creditors themselves to determine whether the settlement was satisfactory, which created problems involving multiple negotiating groups. To solve these issues, the LSE decreased the costs of renegotiation by coordinating the actions 82 In exchange, the individual bondholders agreed to a deposit agreement that committed the individual to be bound by the vote of the CFB majority. 83 Further, the CFB provided information about the borrowing countries, including analysis of the countries' budgets and revenues, which was particularly important given the absence of any credit rating agencies.
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Since its unanimous adoption at a general meeting of foreign-bond holders in London, the CFB was heavily involved in the settlement of nearly all governmental defaults involving British bondholders.
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The existence of a recognized organization of bondholder coordination has been shown to affect bondholders, at least ex post. From the time of the CFB's formation, through the early twentieth century, both the number of and total value of countries in defaults decreased.
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Further, British bondholders-protected by the CFB-realized higher ex post rates of return on foreign bonds than did American bondholders-who did not have the benefit of a bondholder association to protect them. 87 The question of how the protection of a bondholder association The denial of a stock exchange listing was a real penalty that increased the cost of default. While nothing prevented nations in default from attempting to sell bonds over-thecounter via a private placement, bonds without a stock exchange listing were illiquid and ineligible for central clearing and therefore could not be pledged as collateral in the centralized repo market for securities listed on the exchange. 88 Empirical work by Alquist (2010) 89 and
Chavaz and Flandreau (2015) 90 show that Victorian investors demanded compensation for liquidity differences. In addition, there is well-known literature on asset pricing in modern bond markets that convincingly attributes differences between otherwise similarly risky securities to equilibrium compensation for the ability to leverage. 91 In addition to refusing to list new securities on the LSE, members of the stock exchange enacted rules to sanction their fellow members who underwrote new bonds listed elsewhere by sovereigns in default. The result was a penalty remarkably similar to the modern sanction against potential underwriters of Argentine debt today. Although sovereign immunity protects Argentine assets from creditor attachment, the injunction prevents Argentina from floating new bonds or using the payment system to discriminate against bondholders and threatens sanctions against any bank that assists Argentina in doing so. By including hypothecations, historical sovereign borrowers could commit to set aside sufficient revenue to assure repayment and submit to similar punishments should they renege on their promise. Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press Underwriters-banks providing certification services, which were often essential to sovereigns attempting to borrow from private foreign lenders 92 -operated in conjunction with the LSE. These underwriters, each having a long-lived reputation, had incentives to punish defaulters by refusing to issue or sponsor their debts. This punishment stemmed from the fact that underwriters capture economic rents from their reputations. The presence of high-reputation underwriter, a highly monopolized market, signaled the credibility of the borrower and resulted in more favorable lending terms by reducing information asymmetry with investors. The monopolization of high-quality underwriters was the result of (1) high switching costs felt by borrowing sovereigns and (2) the limited availability and high cost of gathering information about the borrowing sovereigns. 93 With so few prestigious underwriters, the importance of maintaining the sponsorship of any given underwriter increased. Further, the presence of one of these higher-rank intermediaries signaled loans that were likely to be repaid, while the use of other, lesser intermediaries signaled loans of lower quality. The concern in maintaining their reputation incentivized the higher-quality intermediaries to monitor the borrowing sovereigns.
The intermediaries could offer better lending terms to sovereigns that repaid and restrict market access to those sovereigns that did not. By agreeing to underwrite the borrowing of only those sovereigns that the intermediaries believed would repay, borrowing sovereigns-in order to retain access to the international capital market-were incentivized to refrain from defaulting. In this way, the high-quality intermediaries that largely came to monopolize the international capital market lent their reputation and credibility to borrowing sovereigns, while also providing monitoring and punishment to sovereigns that did not repay.
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This era of private enforcement began to wane after WWI, in part, because the incentives for cooperation among bondholders-which was a driving factor behind this form of private enforcement-started to disintegrate at the close of the century. As discussed previously, the gradual erosion of sovereign immunity had given individual creditors another avenue to seek redress, thereby limiting the need for cooperation. 95 Also, cooperation among bondholders 92 Borchard & Hotchkiss, supra note 18, 18 ("The great majority of governments in need of funds from private lenders abroad are forced to resort to the procedure of selling the entire bond issue to one or several banking houses for placement on foreign money markets."). 93 Sovereign risk reports were not published by nonbanking entities until 1900, and the creditworthiness on foreign government bonds was not rated until 1918. 97 Without cooperation among the exchanges, a defaulting sovereign could not be cut off from all markets and would still have access to capital after default.
Testable Implications
Economic theory predicts that sovereign borrowers can lower their borrowing costs by including contract terms which raise the cost of default thereby credibly signaling their intent to fulfill the contract. The obvious empirical implication is that bonds that contain such clauses should trade at higher prices (lower yields) than similar bonds without these clauses.
While little literature exists on the pricing impact of the various terms in modern sovereign bond contracts, the literature that does exist shows mixed empirical results. 98 Roubini ( English choice-of-law-terms, and this yield spread increased during the Greek financial crisis. 101 Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press law suffered haircuts of 60-75%, while bonds governed by foreign law were paid in full.
102 Chamon et al. (2014) 103 find that foreign-law bonds carry a lower yield compared to domesticlaw bonds, and the yield premium widens during financial stress.
Note that these results, i.e., that these clauses that raise the cost of default are priced by modern markets -the "contract matters" hypothesis -, is not so surprising given several recent decisions eroding sovereign immunity in modern courts. We present evidence below that contract clauses were also priced in the 19 th century when sovereigns were litigation-proof and sovereign immunity was absolute. One explanation for why contractual protections would be valuable even in a time of absolute sovereign immunity is that they may resolve the ambiguity on whether default has or has not occurred and function as a coordination mechanism in a repeated 
Empirical Examples
Recall that economic theory predicts that a borrower can lower their borrowing rate by "bargaining" for a severe punishment in the event of default. Agreeing to punishment serves as a credible signal that the borrower intends to honor their debt obligation. 105 We observe 660 bonds issued by 49 countries. The sample comprises all the bonds that regularly appeared on the official quotation list of the London Stock Exchange. 106 We were able to identify hypothecation pledges in 34% of the sovereign bonds listed on the LSE before 1929. Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press settlement that employed the pledged revenue without first offering preferential treatment to the secured bondholders. 107 Although these pledges were unenforceable in court, they could nonetheless be valued by the market if they made renegotiation more complex and costly or served as a focal point in post-default bargaining. Recall that sovereigns in default were prohibited from listing new bonds on the London stock exchange until they were able to secure a settlement with a majority of the holders of each outstanding defaulted bond. Holders of bonds with specific hypothecations were loath to accept terms that did not recognize their contractual claims to specific revenues before other bonds with mere full faith and credit promises. As a result, holders of bonds with hypothecations were able to use the threat of market embargo to raise their bonds to a de-facto senior status over bonds without pledged revenue.
Bargaining theory predicts that hypothecations should be valued by the market because the punishments these clauses make possible allow bondholders to negotiate higher recovery values in default, which in turn makes default less likely. 108 A sinking fund is a contractual promise to establish and finance a fund to retire outstanding bonds via a precommitted amortization schedule. Often these funds were given the right to redeem a percentage of outstanding bonds via random draw. When the redemption price was greater than the market value these drawings took on the characteristics of a lottery where drawn bonds were redeemed at prices well above the market value of undrawn bonds. 109 Many bonds were redeemable at the whim of the issuer after a vesting date. Furthermore, some sinking funds included provisions to retire bonds via purchase in the open market or redemption at par, whichever was cheaper. A bondholder who purchased a bond with these options had a cash flow equivalent to the option free bond combined with a short call option at the redemption price. Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press recovery rates, differences in coupon rates, maturity, sinking fund provisions and embedded call options will result in different bond prices and yields-to-maturity. 110 Any comparison of bonds with and without hypothecation clauses must control for the confounding effects of different contract terms. Previous studies using modern data have noted the difficulty in controlling for contractual differences due to the fact that variation in contract terms is non-random. Sovereigns tend to use terms that are largely identical-both to their own previous issuances and to other sovereigns-resulting in fewer differences in contract terms.
Additionally, terms tended to change only in response to certain events, in which case terms would change in clusters making the isolation of price effects on any particular provision very difficult.
111 Each of these difficulties exists in our historical period as well and are often exacerbated by the proliferation of historical contract terms that are "exotic by modern standards."
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We isolate the effect of hypothecations while controlling for other confounding factors by searching our database for examples of multiple bonds issued by the same country that are most similar in standard terms such as coupon rate, time-to-maturity and sinking-fund provisions but differ in hypothecation clauses that give one bond a senior claim over other bonds issued by the same country. 113 Because the effect of these clauses should be most apparent in default, we limit our search to the set of countries that defaulted between 1869 and 1914.
Theory predicts that bonds with clauses that raise the cost of default should have lower default rates and greater recovery in default. Consistent with these predictions, we find examples of both sovereigns who defaulted on unsecured bonds while continuing to pay secured bonds (Spain in 1872) and sovereigns who gave preferential treatment to secured bonds in a restructuring (Argentina in 1890). The Spanish Default in 1872:
Spain had the following three bonds trading in London at the time of their default in 1872:
The Spanish 3% Loan of 1869
Authorized in April 1869 to raise money to retire and consolidate existing internal and external debt, the 3% loan of 1869 was a perpetual bond paying 3% interest. £43,428,000 was issued at an IPO price of 24.46% of par for a yield to maturity of 12.26%. The bond offered no special security beyond the full faith and credit of the Spanish crown.
The 5% Quicksilver Loan
Authorized March 1870, the 5% Quicksilver loan paid 5% interest and was redeemable by an accumulative 1.5% sinking fund which redeemed bonds at par via random drawing. The loan raised £2,318,100 at an IPO price of 80% of par for a yield to maturity of 7.23%. 114 As the name implied, the bond contract hypothecated the production of a quicksilver mine and established the legal machinery to assure the mine's output was under the control of the bondholders. Authorized in September 1871, a 3% perpetual bond was offered at an IPO price of 31% of par for a yield to maturity of 9.68%. The offering was extremely popular, and the £20,727,000 bonds offered were 8 times oversubscribed. The bond offered no special security beyond the full faith and credit of the Spanish crown.
One month after issue a new finance minister was appointed who proposed an 18% tax on all external debt. Bondholders responded by petitioning the Committee of the London Stock exchange to declare Spain in default. A new finance minister was quickly appointed, the tax proposal was abandoned, and diplomatic assurances were sent to London that the 3% bond of 1871 was "free of Spanish taxes."
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IPO Prices and Recovery Values
The Table below were backed by the full faith and credit of the Spanish crown, the Quicksilver loan was the only bond with a hypothecation of specific revenues and contractual protections.
The Quicksilver loan was issued at a yield-to-maturity of 7.23% at a time when the other (unsecured) Spanish bond yielded 11.22%, and the (unsecured) Consolidated Loan of 1871 was brought to market at a yield-to maturity of 9.68% at a time when the Quicksilver loan yielded 7.11%. Investors clearly preferred the Quicksilver loan and were willing to pay a higher price (accept a lower yield) to hold it. We should be careful not to assign all the difference in yield to the better contractual protection of the Quicksilver hypothecation, however. These loans differed 116 Id. at 432.
Yield-to-Maturity March 1870 Sept 1871 Quicksilver 5% 7.23% 7.11% Spanish 3% 1869 11.22% 8.96% consolidated 3% 1871 9.68% Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press in time to maturity and, consequently, duration risk, but the sheer magnitude of the yield differences is too large to be entirely (or even mostly) attributable to differences in maturity.
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A likely explanation for the price differences is that investors preferred the security of the Quicksilver hypothecation. In fact, this preference was well founded. Despite Spain's ability to access capital markets as late as 1871, the Spanish government was a poor credit. Fiscal deficits forced Spain into default in 1872. However, Spain had hypothecated the production of their quicksilver mine to the underwriters of the Quicksilver Loan, and the fear of legal difficulties selling quicksilver abroad convinced the Spanish crown that defaulting on the Quicksilver loan was not worth the savings. As a result, the Quicksilver bonds retained a remarkable share of their value when their issuing sovereign defaulted on other debt.
One of the unique features of our pre-1914 data is that, unlike modern markets, 118 historical bonds continued to be quoted during defaults and restructurings, 119 so it is possible to see the evolution of expectations of recovery rates. Clearly Spain had no qualms about violating her other sovereign bond contract. But the Quicksilver hypothecation came with a detailed contract that tasked the underwriters to establish the machinery to take custody of the mine's output and transport and sell the quicksilver in Europe. The value of the collateral was greater than the coupon payments, so the bondholder trustees were returning a positive cash flow to Spain. True, the Spaniards could have increased this annual cash flow by the £150,000 necessary to service the bonds, but this would have 117 The modified durations (how sensitive a bond's price is to changes in interest rates) of these bonds are very similar. If investors believed the probability of default and recovery values were the same across all Spanish bonds, these investors could form extremely high return and low variance portfolios by buying the high yielding bonds and selling the low yielding Quicksilver Loan. Such a portfolio would have an expected sharp ratio (excess return divided by standard deviation of return) more than 10 times greater than the observed sharp ratios on other stocks and bonds trading at the time. Every investor could dramatically increase their return and lower their risk by buying this portfolio. The fact that investors did not flock to this "good deal" is strong evidence that they did not expect all Argentina had ten bonds trading in London at the time of the Barings Crisis. Luckily for our purpose, four of these bonds were issued at roughly the same time and offered similar coupons and sinking fund formulas, but only one of the bonds included a specific hypothecation of revenues. The bond particulars are reproduced below from an 1898 investment guide for bondholders.
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The 5% Loan of 1886-7 After the crisis, the Argentine government and a coalition of foreign lenders worked out a restructuring arrangement known as the Romero Arrangement. Central to the restructuring plan was a moratorium on sinking fund redemptions and a temporary haircut on coupon payments bundled with a new funding loan issued in Europe whose proceeds would pay the reduced coupons for a period of three years.
To induce foreigners to fund Argentina during the restructuring, the funding loan was guaranteed by a hypothecation of custom duties and a law was passed which made any unpaid coupons on the funding loan legal tender for custom taxes. The custom duties had previously been hypothecated in the 5% loan of 1886-7, however, and the funding loan could not be listed on the LSE if the 1886-7 bondholders objected. The Romero agreement therefore gave preferential treatment to the 1886-7 bondholders in the form of smaller haircuts for a shorter duration and first claim on future surpluses until their missed coupons were made current. As a result, the recovery value of the 5% loan of 1886-7 was much higher than bonds backed by only the full faith and credit of Argentina.
We cannot be certain that bondholders anticipated the preferential treatment of the 1886-7 Loan at time of issue, but consistent with the theory the 5% 1886-7 bonds had a lower yield than the IPO yields of similar bonds issued in the years before the Barings crisis.
Yields on IPO dates
And the market price of the 5% Loan of 1886-7 was considerable higher than similar bonds throughout the Romero restructuring. Figure 2 plots the market price (% of par). 
Conclusion
Before World War I the London Stock Exchange enforced sanctions against sovereign defaulters that were remarkably similar in practice to the current pari passu injunction.
Nonetheless, developing nations with less than sterling credit flocked to the LSE, and London became the unquestioned "banker to the world." Not only did developing nations list in London, but they often voluntarily included contract clauses that made restructuring more difficult and costly. Why would sovereign borrowers list in a jurisdiction where default carried real consequences? Because these borrowers knew that lenders valued contractual protections and expected to be rewarded with cheaper borrowing rates. Borrowing governments are worse off if the cost of default is too low because potential lenders know default is likely and demand a high yield or refuse to lend at any rate. Therefore, borrowing sovereigns can benefit ex ante if, in drafting the bond contract, they are able to raise the cost of default.
Given the LSE's historical success of enforcing secured debt through a private informal mechanism of commitment and punishment, it is puzzling that similar commitment mechanisms are frowned upon today. Despite the criticism that it may possibly vindicate holdout creditors, 36 Forthcoming at Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press the recent pari passu rulings offer a mechanism for sovereign borrowers to signal their commitment. Although modern sovereigns who default on bonds with pari passu clauses now face a much more difficult road to re-organization, and although the ruling is unquestionably costly for nations currently in default, it does not follow that developing nations will be worse off. History suggests that bond investors value clauses that raise the cost of default, and there is every reason to believe that in the wake of the pari passu ruling modern investors will likewise reward nations who include pari passu clauses in their bond offerings. A caveat is that the pari passu only gets us half-way to the world that existed in 19th century London, as many legacy bonds do not contain collective action clauses, a mechanism to resolve disputes analogous to the functions performed by the London Stock Exchange in conjunction with the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.
In our days, while security interests are prevalent in domestic debt, which is held by foreigners as well, security interests are rare in sovereign bonds. 122 Instead, modern bonds rely on clauses that grant creditors structural priority, the ability to sue given by pari passu clauses and foreign law clauses waiving immunity. Given the muddle involved in litigation, the granting of structural preference seems like an inefficient way to bind oneself compared to the security rights used in the past. A fruitful avenue for future research would investigate the puzzle of why and when collateral and priority clauses have fallen out of favor in modern sovereign bonds.
The recent court order which effectively bars Argentina from issuing new debt while in default on existing debt has been met with much consternation from the legal community. A great deal of the criticism has focused on the practical implications of the ruling with dire warnings that developing nations will be unable to borrow, and nations whose courts dare to enforce contracts will find their markets shunned by international borrowers. Such criticisms disregard the fundamental fact that markets require both borrowers and lenders. While borrowers would no doubt prefer a market where funding is cheap and default has few consequences, lenders are unlikely to lend cheaply, if at all, under such conditions. A jurisdiction that enforces contract rights may be unappealing to borrowers in default, but new borrowers who choose to signal their willingness to repay by listing in such markets should be rewarded with lower interest rates.
